

A Case for Representation and Inclusivity

Atticus Finch. Tom Robinson. I did not want to turn the page. I knew Tom Robinson was innocent and I wanted justice for him. But when I read the jury refused to even look at him, I already knew the verdict. This was my introduction to the US criminal “justice” system: Atticus Finch representing a Black man in the Jim Crow South. It was a feeling I never could shake and has followed me throughout my life. At home, with friends, and at school, I could not resist the urge to remind others to take the high road and that morality should win against all odds. But herein was the conflict: whose morals do we base our bright-line test on?

As I near the end of my second semester of law school, I realize the lack of representation of women and other minorities creates a palpable imbalance in the legal system. It is not so much that classroom discussions do not carry their weight (although this should be addressed as well), but rather that the reading materials are overflowing with inequitable decisions that leave law students like me wondering why the system works for some and not others. I often reflect on my teenage years and think about how I have been greatly influenced and molded into the woman I am today by people in school and at work whose families look nothing like mine. I am not referring to influence in the vapid sense (e.g. your favorite television show, foods, music, or taste in fashion), but rather in a substantive sense (e.g. what crimes are worthy of punishment, the type of punishment, or who we should punish).

As a teenager, I could not articulate why what I saw on the Latinx news station at home made me feel conflicted about what I was learning from my teachers and peers. Today, I recognize a lack of representation as the cause. I prefer the term representation over diversity because I believe the latter connotes token diversity, or diversity for the sake of diversity. Our American legal system and Bar (used here and in the remainder of this essay to refer to judges and attorneys)

is painfully homogenous and is not an accurate reflection of our citizenry. This has allowed for immoral decisions and policies that have disenfranchised women and other minorities.

In this essay, I will first discuss some of the most well-known cases in Supreme Court jurisprudence to show how lack of representation in the Bar is linked to gravely unjust results. In all but one of these cases, the Supreme Court was made up of white men. I believe these cases demonstrate the link between morals upheld time after time by white men that we now rebuke because they work to disenfranchise minorities (Black, disabled, queer, etc.). There was no Black justice on the Supreme Court until Justice Thurgood Marshall and there was no woman on the Supreme Court until Sandra Day O'Connor.

Next, I will discuss the importance of four well-known attorneys (three of which later became Supreme Court Justices) who led the Supreme Court to justice in separate cases. Here, we see that even the tiniest bit of increased representation in the Bar helped correct past injustices. I argue that these attorneys, extremely self-aware of the discrimination they endured, were driven by different morals. Their morals are not necessarily superior but they deserve our recognition because they were molded by their experiences with discrimination.

Finally, I discuss a plan of action that will help increase minority representation and inclusivity in the Bar. I believe the more minorities are represented in the Bar, the more likely we can make decisions and craft policies that reflect the morals of people who have been historically excluded and disenfranchised. Additionally, making the study and practice of law more accessible to minorities is **essential for equality, justice, and the rule of law.**

A. Immoral Supreme Court Decisions Linked to Lack of Representation

Since the mid 1950s, the US public education system has believed that “in the field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.”¹ However, neither our public education system, nor our legal system began in 1954. It is crucial to recognize the founding principles of philosophy, morality, and punishment that sowed the seeds of the once constitutional idea of “separate but equal.” One example of our founding principles is the consensus that Hammurabi’s Code will not be the rule of law, but rather that we would adopt English Common Law and modify as needed. However, there have been various points in history when we have been on the wrong side of morality.

Historically, egregious policies and decisions have upheld the capital of rich, landowning, white men, at the expense of minorities. For instance, in *Dred Scott v. Sandford*, the court held Black slaves were property: “treat them as property, and make it the duty of the Government to protect it; no other power, in relation to this race, is to be found in the Constitution.”² Slavery was not abolished by the states until 1865, however, this proximate end does not diminish the severe impact of *Dred Scott*. The Taney Supreme Court was comprised of seven conservative, wealthy, white men who made a decision which ensured the legal disenfranchisement of Black slaves. An overlooked consequence of *Dred Scott* was the fact that it “effectively left blacks to state remedies.”³ Black people, whether free or enslaved, were not allowed to bring diversity suits. This was considered “good law” until the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in July 1868.⁴

Even when white men were voting against clearly racist holdings, they demonstrated they were also motivated by racist ideologies. This is evident in Justice Harlan’s cringeworthy dissent

¹ *Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kan.*, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954), *supplemented sub nom. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan.*, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).

² *Dred Scott v. Sandford*, 60 U.S. 393, 425 (1857), *superseded* (1868).

³ Sam Erman, *An "Unintended Consequence": Dred Scott Reinterpreted*, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 1157, 1159 (2008).

⁴ *Id.* at 1161.

in *Plessy v. Ferguson*, where he states the white race believes it is the dominant race and he has no doubt it will continue to be, but “in view of the constitution...our constitution is color-blind.”⁵ Even though Justice Harlan voted against the *Plessy* holding, he did not fully abandon racist morals. The colorblind approach to justice has not advanced the fight against racism. In fact, not recognizing the nuances of race and not allowing people whose lives are molded by racism allows racism to thrive. When we expose Justice Harlan’s colorblind myth for what it really is, we can understand why he cast a racist vote in the *Chinese Exclusion Cases*.⁶

Lack of representation of disabled lawyers also had a grave consequence. For instance, in *Buck v. Bell*, the court endorsed eugenics.⁷ The impact of *Buck* was the surge in eugenic sterilization laws across the country, the result being “[tens of thousands of Americans] involuntarily sterilized pursuant to these statutes over the next few decades.”⁸ The only dissenter, Justice Butler, did not write a dissent.⁹ This is especially poignant to me because it speaks to a moral conflict: Justice Butler does not agree with an ableist decision, but also refuses to publicly sympathize with the disabled community’s plight. I believe even when everybody seems to be against you, there is value in recognizing another’s humanity and Justice Butler missed an opportunity to do so.

We see a colorblind mentality emerge again in *Korematsu v. U.S.*, where the court dismisses the racial component of the case by categorizing the issue as a matter of “military urgency of the situation.”¹⁰ How can an exclusive policy that is enforceable depending on the race

⁵ *Plessy v. Ferguson*, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896), overruled by *Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Shawnee Cnty, Kan.*, 347 U.S. 559 (1954).

⁶ Goodwin Liu, “*History Will Be Heard*”: An Appraisal of the Seattle/Louisville Decision, 2 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 53, 57 (2008).

⁷ Hilary Eisenberg, *The Impact of Dicta in Buck v. Bell*, 30 J. Contemp. Health L. & Policy 184, 185 (2013).

⁸ Roberta M. Berry, *From Involuntary Sterilization to Genetic Enhancement: The Unsettled Legacy of Buck v. Bell*, 12 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Policy 401, 420 (1998).

⁹ *Buck v. Bell*, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).

¹⁰ *Toyosaburo Korematsu v. U.S.*, 323 U.S. 214, 222 (1944), abrogated by *Trump v. Hawaii*, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).

of a person be viewed through an objective lens that ignores race? The white men on the *Korematsu* court did not have the range to address the nuances of petitioner Korematsu's situation and ultimately made a ruling that deservedly "belongs on the list of the worst Supreme Court rulings."¹¹ The greatest consequence of *Korematsu* was the court's affirmation that the detention and disenfranchisement of thousands of people on the basis of race was justified because of the government's interests.

Lack of queer representation and the desire to uphold the status quo opens our eyes to the true evil of the *Bowers*¹² decision, which explicitly excludes heterosexual people from the court's analysis.¹³ The majority in *Bowers*, consisting of four men and the first woman on the bench, neglected to consider the significance of their decision to millions of queer people. The consequence is legal precedence that warns queer people to be wary of the state, even in the privacy of their bedroom. This is a consequence that we would unilaterally repudiate if it was meant to apply to everyone because of how demoralizing it is, regardless of creed.

A theme that reappears in the aforementioned Supreme Court cases is reminiscent of the Hans Christian Andersen classic *The Emperor's New Clothes*.¹⁴ The villagers' fear of confronting the emperor is analogous to the Supreme Court's refusal to reflect on their harmful decisions. In *Lawrence*, Justice Kennedy told the emperor he was not wearing any clothes when he exposed the immorality of the *Bowers* decision: "Bowers was not correct when it was decided, is not correct today, and is hereby overruled."¹⁵ Lack of minority representation in the Bar increases peoples'

¹¹ Erwin Chemerinsky, *Korematsu v. United States: A Tragedy Hopefully Never to Be Repeated*, 39 Pepp. L. Rev. 163, 166 (2011).

¹² *Bowers v. Hardwick*, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), overruled by *Lawrence v. Texas*, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).

¹³ Mitchell Lloyd Pearl, *Chipping Away at Bowers v. Hardwick: Making the Best of an Unfortunate Decision*, 63 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 154, 181 (1988).

¹⁴ Dan Jacobson, *The Emperor Has No Completed Operations*, 56 Orange County Law. 28 (July 2014).

¹⁵ *Lawrence v. Texas*, 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003).

fears of confronting the Supreme Court's problematic morals. Future members of the bar would benefit from holding a mirror to landmark Supreme Court cases, as Justice Kennedy did.

B. Increased Representation Linked to Justice

I often hear people say legality does not equal morality, with a reminder that “morals change.” This is not comforting, especially when I think of all the lives that have been harmed because our morals did not catch up in time. More importantly, however, this platitude fails to acknowledge a crucial component of our legal history: people have fought hard for change. From lobbyists, professors, teachers, social workers, nurses, etc., the fact remains that people have put their lives on the line for a greater cause. Often the people pushing for change seek to repair a flaw in the system that has allowed for continued disenfranchisement. Today, many of us thanklessly enjoy the fruits of these advocates' labor.

However, some people believe the court of public opinion wrongfully drives movements for justice and change. For instance, Justice Scalia once wrote about his distress that the Supreme Court was too often tasked with deciding issues that had strong pressure from the public.¹⁶ I surmise that if it were not for people pushing for greater accessibility and representation, inertia would prevail. Consequently, we would not have a legal world that paved the way for great attorneys like Thurgood Marshall, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Bryan Stevenson.

The advocacy of Thurgood Marshall, who later became the first Black American Supreme Court Justice, was essential for the petitioners in *Shelley v. Kraemer*¹⁷. Marshall grew up in the era of Jim Crow and his journey to reach this point, arguing at the Supreme Court, was not happenstance. He knew the Black American experience and how the law mistreated Black

¹⁶ *Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pennsylvania v. Casey*, 505 U.S. 833, 999 (1992).

¹⁷ *Shelley v. Kraemer*, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948).

Americans.¹⁸ Marshall attended segregated schools throughout his life, but Marshall’s morals and conviction went beyond racial equality. Marshall impassionedly believed lawyers do not have the sole duty to represent their clients, but also a “duty to represent the public, to be social reformers in however small a way.”¹⁹ In *Shelley*, Marshall advocated not just for his Black clients, but to enforce the rule of law that enumerated his clients’ constitutional rights. Later, on the Supreme Court, Justice Marshall never failed to contribute his distinct perspective.²⁰

Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s advocacy was vital²¹ in both *Craig*²² and *Califano*²³. In *Califano v. Goldfarb*, the court held a statute that required widowers to prove their financial dependence on their deceased spouse to receive survivors’ benefits was unconstitutional.²⁴ The *Califano* court’s analysis was rooted in the “intermediate standard of scrutiny established” by the *Craig* court.²⁵ As an attorney, Ginsburg made it her mission to fight for equal protection for all genders and co-founded the ACLU Women's Rights Project during the 1970s.²⁶

Ginsburg later became the second woman to serve on the Supreme Court. Like Justice Thurgood Marshall, Ginsburg recognized the consequences of our “discriminatory past” and deemed it imperative to redress.²⁷ During her time on the Supreme Court, Justice Ginsburg has proffered a point of view that sheds light on inequality and the importance of considering the impact judicial interpretations have on women and other minorities. Part of redressing (as

¹⁸ Judge Lynn Adelman, *The Glorious Jurisprudence of Thurgood Marshall*, 7 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 113, 118 (2013).

¹⁹ *Id.* at 116.

²⁰ *Id.* at 118.

²¹ Lenora M. Lapidus, *Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the Development of Gender Equality Jurisprudence Under the Fourteenth Amendment*, 43 Harbinger 149, 151 (2019).

²² *Craig v. Boren*, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).

²³ *Califano v. Goldfarb*, 430 U.S. 199, 217, 197 (1977).

²⁴ *Id.* at 217.

²⁵ Lapidus *supra* at 152.

²⁶ Neil S. Siegel, “Equal Citizenship Stature”: Justice Ginsburg’s Constitutional Vision, 43 New Eng. L. Rev. 799, 817 (2009).

²⁷ *Id.* at 823.

Ginsburg calls it) is allowing other perspectives to be heard and realizing that inequality must be affirmatively repudiated. This is a crucial component of her own moral compass. Justice Ginsburg recognizes that it is not enough to stand idly by while immoral decisions are made. Instead, we must actively work to combat them.

It is often said that when more women are allowed in spaces, they pave the way for folks from other oppressed communities to effect change. The *Windsor*²⁸ court, comprised of three women and six men, is a prime example of this. In terms of gender representation, it is the most inclusive the bench has ever been (and remains so today). I believe this fact is material to the holding in *Windsor*. As much as the holding in *Windsor* dealt with marriage equality, it also tackled basic dignity for all persons.²⁹ The experiences of the three women on the bench, one of whom is Latina, are central to understanding how discriminatory legislation harms society.

If we accept the idea that morals change and society tends to accommodate those changes, we must also recognize the pioneers that lead to equitable and just rule of law. I believe Justice Sotomayor is one of those pioneers. Justice Sotomayor (the first and only Latina to serve on the Supreme Court) has expressed concerns that demonstrate a person who is fully aware of the power of empathy and how it can put a check on discriminatory policies.³⁰ Justice Sotomayor has been able to bridge a gap in understanding between disadvantaged defendants and the Bar because her empathy does not compromise her impartiality.³¹ This is evidenced by Justice Sotomayor's ability to identify with the defendant in *Calhoun v. United States*³², coupled with her decision to deny certiorari.³³

²⁸ *U.S. v. Windsor*, 570 U.S. 744, 744 (2013).

²⁹ *Id.* at 775.

³⁰ Veronica Couzo, *Sotomayor's Empathy Moves the Court A Step Closer to Equitable Adjudication*, 89 Notre Dame L. Rev. 403, 418 (2013).

³¹ *Id.* at 419.

³² *Calhoun v. U.S.*, 568 U.S. 1206, 1206 (2013).

³³ Couzo, *supra*.

Attorney Bryan Stevenson has more recently challenged the Supreme Court's morals. Stevenson is the founder of the Equal Justice Initiative in Montgomery, Alabama, which combats racial injustice in the criminal justice system.³⁴ What I find most fascinating and reputable about Stevenson is not his big win for justice in *Miller v. Alabama*³⁵, but his relentless fight for the Supreme Court to be consistent in the rule of law. Stevenson, like Thurgood Marshall, has fought to uphold constitutional principles so that other disenfranchised folks may rightfully benefit. This is evidenced in *Montgomery v. Louisiana*, where the court held its previous ruling (in *Miller*), should be applied retroactively.³⁶ (The Equal Justice Initiative represented the petitioner in *Montgomery*.)

Attorneys like Bryan Stevenson are invaluable in the fight to course correct our criminal justice system because defendants facing grave punishments deserve representation by advocates who can skillfully explain the nuanced role of mitigating factors at sentencing.³⁷ Today, Stevenson is recognized as a leading lawyer in the continuing fight for civil rights in Alabama.³⁸ His boundless advocacy and experience as a Black American attorney continue to provide him with opportunities to transform our criminal justice system into one that implores the Supreme Court listen to those disenfranchised and find for equality and justice.

Stevenson's desire to champion civil rights was not an overnight decision. Stevenson was motivated by the discrimination he has endured and the morals these experiences have etched into him. As an attorney seeking to champion civil rights, he has followed the footsteps of attorneys

³⁴ Leonard S. Rubinowitz, *The Courage of Civil Rights Lawyers: Fred Gray and His Colleagues*, 67 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1227, 1274 (2017).

³⁵ *Miller v. Alabama*, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012).

³⁶ *Montgomery v. Louisiana*, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016), as revised (Jan. 27, 2016).

³⁷ Miriam S. Gohara, *In Defense of the Injured: How Trauma-Informed Criminal Defense Can Reform Sentencing*, 45 Am. J. Crim. L. 1, 24 (2018).

³⁸ Leonard S. Rubinowitz, *The Courage of Civil Rights Lawyers: Fred Gray and His Colleagues*, 67 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1227, 1274 (2017).

Thurgood Marshall and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Additionally, he fought for the court to recognize the basic dignity of his disadvantaged clients through the rule of law, emulating Justice Sotomayor.

C. A Plan of Action to Increase Representation and Inclusivity in the Bar

As I highlighted above, attorneys from different underrepresented communities have made great strides in the movement to liberate disenfranchised and disadvantaged folks. Even so, Thurgood Marshall, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Bryan Stevenson share one significant thing in common: they were given extraordinary opportunities to effect change. I believe any movement for justice starts here. When somebody has a chance to be in the room where it happens, they are heard by people with the power to make change and lift up the voices of other activists who do work on the ground level. I believe to ensure equity, the primary goal should be to provide students of different backgrounds and experiences access to legal careers.

Change begins with an opportunity. Below, I discuss a plan comprised of three steps law schools, faculty, and students can follow to increase representation and inclusivity of minorities in the Bar. The first step is founded on community outreach, the key element being early exposure to the law. The second step involves making the law school application process more accessible to minorities. Standardized testing, for instance, often poses a barrier to students of color and disabled students. The final step is to change the way law students learn in the classroom. There is detectable bias in law casebooks and class discussions. Whether this bias is implicit or explicit is insignificant when we consider the gravity of the consequences. Students are taught to ignore these consequences as we cling to a moral compass that continues to produce disparate treatment under the law.

i. Step One

The first step is to increase early exposure to legal careers. I suggest a bifurcated approach where 1) law schools create programs that work to introduce community members to legal studies and 2) these programs offer law school applicants opportunities to work in the legal field prior to applying to law school. Early exposure to the law can effect great change. The average person does not know their fundamental legal rights or what steps they can take to protect those rights.

Loyola Law School (“LLS”) has a program called “Young Lawyers Program” which seeks to bridge the gap between at risk youth and professional careers.³⁹ LLS recruits students from high schools in lower income communities and hosts them once a week for a class taught by law students, alumni, and/or practicing attorneys. In this way, LLS makes active efforts to reach out to communities where students have not even considered attending college. To elevate this community-based approach, law schools should also reach out to adults in the community from different fields. For instance, doctors, nurses, legal assistants, teachers, and church leaders. This would expose people from various other fields to legal careers. There is tremendous value in presenting legal educational opportunities to people from many backgrounds that intersect with the law because this can expand the law school applicant pool and ultimately lead to diverse law school classes. (The intent is not to reduce the number of professionals in those aforementioned disciplines, but rather to expand the undergraduate disciplines represented in law school classrooms.)

There is also value in taking time off from school to gain experience working outside of the academia bubble. The same programs I suggest above should also offer externships and financial assistance to community members so they may gain experience in the legal field before

³⁹ Loyola Law School, Young Lawyers Program, <https://www.lls.edu/thellsdifference/socialjusticefocus/publicinterestprobonoservices/younglawyersprogram/> (last visited Mar. 5, 2020).

actually applying to law school. This essentially encourages a gap year for those who want to make an informed decision before committing to law school. I realize that a gap year will have different advantages and disadvantages depending on the individual student, but so many of us were advised at one point not to apply to law school until we were absolutely sure it is what we want to pursue.⁴⁰

The chronic stress and job dissatisfaction in the legal community should not be overlooked.⁴¹ It is not enough for students to make it to law school and survive. They must also be prepared for the demands of law school and subsequent demands of being an attorney. We should desire for students to be aware of legal career opportunities they have and subsequently survive and thrive in their legal careers.

ii. Step Two

The second step is to make the law school application process more accessible. This would also work to ensure a more diverse pool of applicants. Recently, many law schools, including Columbia University School of Law, have accepted applicants' GRE scores in lieu of LSAC's LSAT scores.⁴² Many studies show "the LSAT disadvantages people of color, and especially black and Latino law school applicants."⁴³ Law schools should also be open to alternatives to standardized testing, as standardization "is, by definition, in tension with the word accommodation" and highly disadvantages students with disabilities.⁴⁴

Disabled applicants should be centered in conversations about accessibility and I believe any strides we can make to help disabled students advance will also help other applicants. As

⁴⁰ Prof. Michael L. Fox & Joel B. Strauss, *Considering Law School? Undergraduates Should Contemplate This Advice from Pre-Law Advisors*, 90 N.Y. St. B.J. 16, 19 (2018).

⁴¹ Dr. Diana Uchiyama, *Flame Out: Preventing Burnout in the Legal Profession*, 68 DOJ J. Fed. L. & Prac. 97, 98–99 (2020).

⁴² Fox, *supra* at 20.

⁴³ Demetria Frank, *Social Inequity, Cultural Reform & Diversity in the Legal Profession*, 13 S.J. Pol'y & Just. 25, 31 (2019).

⁴⁴ Jonathan Lazar, *The Use of Screen Reader Accommodations by Blind Students in Standardized Testing: A Legal and Socio-Technical Framework*, 48 J.L. & Educ. 185, 188 (2019).

someone who becomes frantic upon seeing a scantron, I am happy that the LSAT has changed from paper format to digital. This is a start to increasing accessibility to disabled applicants. However, LSAC should work with advocates for disabled communities and other minority communities (as well as activists) to create testing conditions that minimize physical barriers and reduce anxiety.

iii. Step Three

The third step is for law professors to incorporate learning methods into their course syllabi that challenge traditional notions of “reasonableness” and “objectivity.” In first year courses, there is a word that shows up in every case book: “reasonable.” However, this word is conflicting to me because it mirrors my earlier concerns about morals and whose morals prevail. How do we decide whose “reasonable” view prevails? For starters, we know that hegemony has limited certain groups’ capacities to express their factual beliefs. For instance, our system designates jurors as fact finders, but we have a history of racially motivated juror strikes.⁴⁵ Additionally, we have seen cases like *Korematsu* where the court solely framed the question “from the point of view of some government decision-makers.”⁴⁶

It is incorrect to state that our notions of “reasonableness” are grounded in “objectivity.” We must actively identify and address this problem continually permeating our case books. First, we must recognize that legal analysis is not objective, but rather founded in somebody’s perspective.⁴⁷ Sometimes that perspective is a police officer and other times it is a business owner. Our different life experiences and backgrounds undoubtedly inform our perspectives, but many of

⁴⁵ See *Flowers v. Mississippi*, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2251 (2019) (holding the trial court erred in concluding that the State’s peremptory strike of a particular black prospective juror was not motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent the District Attorney purposely struck Black jurors).

⁴⁶ Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, *Foreword: Toward A Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal Education*, 4 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women's Stud. 33, 39 (1994).

⁴⁷ *Id.* at 48.

us are conditioned to put them on the backburner and default to a centrist view. The result being we end up learning and memorizing critiques that conflict with our intuitions, rather than critiques that reflect our experiences and characteristics.⁴⁸

We need to challenge this and the work begins in the classroom. All professors should encourage nuanced dialogue about “reasonableness” so students do not have to repress their views when they analyze cases. Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw suggests “discussing judicial opinions in ways that [meet] the logic of the decisions and that were responsive to the arguments and views expressed therein.”⁴⁹ We do not want to “deny a reality that its readers feel they know,” but rather help them understand the “objective” way to arrive at the holding.⁵⁰ There is so much room for disagreement in the law and flexibility when it comes to identifying possible causes of action. Professors, therefore, should cultivate an environment that empowers students to be critical and challenge default perspectives.

Law professors should allow students to identify gaps in egregious court decisions and address the implicit and explicit biases which found the court’s analyses. Students should not be forced to abandon their moral convictions to understand the law. When forced to shed morality in pursuit of knowledge, we risk becoming emperors with our clothes off.

Conclusion

I do my best to keep an open mind while studying the law and I have two practices I like to follow: 1) note my moral conflicts when a decision or policy I read contradicts my moral philosophy and 2) listen to professors and peers when they bring up a view I failed to consider

⁴⁸ *Id.* at 49.

⁴⁹ *Id.* at 50.

⁵⁰ *Id.*

(even when it is painful to hear). My quotidian efforts are consistent with my desire to see different perspectives uplifted and more people represented.

Ultimately, this is the impact *To Kill A Mockingbird* had on me and this is what I wish to see more of during the remainder of my studies. To feel comfortable about what we study and preach, we should champion justice. That can only happen when we have ensured all people have been given an opportunity to be heard. I now invite you to consider the need for increased representation and inclusivity in the Bar as a critical goal. I for one would feel better knowing that our attorneys and judges are reflective of society. I believe the case law, leaders, and plan of action I discussed comprise one comprehensive method of reaching this goal.